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MOTIVATION
Supplier Standardization and 
Common Buys
Supplier and GSFC Flight 
Spares
Shrinking Budgets and 
Compressed Schedules
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Avoid unknowns and establish hard barriers/checkpoints to mitigate the 
risk of failures; this leads to potentially de-focusing resources from 
“true” risks and increasing the risk of unknowns
What Has NASA/GSFC Done in the Past?
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IMAGINE
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What Can NASA/GSFC Do?
Balance the need to know everything while avoiding blind trust 
through the use of risk analysis; this leads to focusing resources 
on “true” risk discovery and mitigations not just compliance.
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GSFC Inheritance Risk Assessment 
Process
7
Initiate 
Inheritance 
Plans & 
Gather Data
Perform Data 
Review and 
Assessment
Conduct 
TIMS/WGs for 
Additional Data 
& Understanding
Develop and 
Finalize 
Inheritance 
Assessments 
Release Final 
Inheritance 
w/SMA 
Endorsement and 
Risk  Assessment 
Plan:
- Identify potential 
components 
(spares, COTS, 
Std components, 
Build-to-Print)  
that are suitable 
for the mission
Evaluate:
‒ Determine what 
data is available 
from SC CRAE/ 
vendor/previous 
project
‒ Acquire 
additional data 
Heritage Data  collection and evaluation Includes:
a) Deviations/Waivers of each item from original design;
b) Summary results of qualification, acceptance, and/or prototype/protoflight
testing completed, or comparison of current qualification/protoqual
requirements and what was performed/realized on the inherited design, 
including environments, required design margins, and life;
c) Flight history of the items and specific attributes for each flight, including 
environments (compare previous environment to current, including duty cycle 
and general concept of operations);
d) Ground and on-orbit anomaly and failure history including the determination of 
root causes; 
e) Specifications and/or standards used to develop the item; 
f) Previous as-built parts list, including lot date codes, and the differences for new 
inherited item;
g) Known obsolete parts that are intended to be supplied out of existing inventory, 
along with quantity required vs available in inventory;
h) Materials list and approved Material Usage Agreements (MUAs).  Materials list 
includes lot date codes and evidence that GIDEP alerts and advisories have been 
properly dispositioned.   
i) List of major electrical and mechanical analyses completed and summary of 
results.
j) Reliability analyses performed for the most recent version of the product. 
k) Identification of significant changes in manufacturing from qualified unit to 
current unit (facility, process, subtier supplier, testing changes, company change 
of ownership, etc)
l) Supplier Performance history and consistency
Generate: 
- Findings and 
recommendation for 
risk-based  use
- Risk statement(s) with 
a likelihood and 
consequence in the 
standard GSFC 5x5 
format with mitigation 
options 
- Recommended 
requirement tailoring 
/verification
- Review findings/risks/ 
recommendations with 
project/CSO
Risk-Based SMA 
requirements are  
implemented
TIMs/WGs Data collection and evaluation includes:
a) Performance  and use clarifications
b) Risk tolerance of NCRs/previous failures
c) Heads up on risks and use recommendations.
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Typical Results to Date
Flight Spare 
Heat Pipes
Recommended: 1) Additional thermal analysis on Radiator Ammonia Heat Pipes (B03, B04, B06); 2) Avoid using Radiator 
Ammonia Heat Pipe (B10) until leakage can be resolved; 3) Conduct mechanical/thermal analysis to determine if tolerance 
/thickness violations on Link Bars, Cryocooler Radiator Doubler and Mount Targets is not an issue, then either use with 
drawing update (and close risk) or discard. Re-machining may cause additional issues and unknown risks.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) EEE Parts - Parts approved based on inheritance review. No Re-
use MRB is required, or new ABPLs are needed for on-hand components; 2) Materials - N/A for products on hand. Previous 
approvals and testing on Previous Mission are applicable.
COTS Reaction 
Wheel 
Assembly 
(RWA) 
Recommended: 1) Accept the RWAs as a black-box COTS items with full functional verification for acceptance of and 
contractual return/replacement for non-functional units. This implies the acceptance Vendor processes, parts, materials, 
and the expectation of advertised performance; 2) Conduct inspections or similar action to verify fabrication form, fit, and 
function is per specification and return/replace non-conforming units; 3) Use this Risk Assessment as a replacement for any 
waivers/deviation on RWA fabrication, parts, materials, or processes and as a proviso to acceptance documentation.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Quality Management System - Item is  a proven COTS from 
proven vendor therefore standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no process verification is required; 2) 
Qualification – N/A; COTS item has been previously proven on previous mission; 3) ESD - Item is a proven COTS from 
proven vendor therefore standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required; 4) 
Board/Connection Building – a proven COTS item from proven vendor with high heritage printed wiring board, thus 
coupons are not required; And vendor’s processes have been proven sufficient to manage repairs, board integrity as well as 
soldering  and flux materials; 5) EEE Parts - Parts are approved based on this inheritance review. No new ABPLs are needed 
supplied standard parts list is sufficient, unless changes are made. Vendor responses to GIDEPs should be pursued and kept 
up-to-date; 6) Materials – Materials approved via this inheritance review and TESS waivers noted above on epoxy and 
marking ink; 7) Contamination - Item is COTS therefore standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no 
verification is required.
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Typical Results to Date
Fight Launch 
Lock spare
Recommended: 1) Process BTP items with routine certifications and inspections; 2) Complete planned Re-work and the 
needed Re-work on Previous Mission Telescope Shield; 3) Certify and full assess impacts of modified items as if new 
designs.; 3) Conduct modified item qualification applicability assessments to find out if changes do not invalidate previous 
qualifications and if so do not re-qualify if not re-qualify.
MAR requirement verifications/changes: 1) Qualification – BTP and on-hand Inherited items are all already qualified; 
Compliance with qualification requirements can be established using this inheritance review. However, modified items 
should be qualified or have a qualification assessment to establish qualification based on similarity; 2) Materials - Previous 
approvals and testing on Previous Mission are applicable to products on hand and that are Build-to-Print and/or modified 
items. However, modified items needed material certification to ensure compliance and identify any new material not used 
on Previous Mission.
Flight Scene 
Select mirrors 
and Filter 
assemblies & 
components 
Recommended:  1) Certify and full assess impacts of modified items as if new designs. For these optics this entails 
completing planned Re-figuring with routine certifications, inspections, and qualifications as well as updating impacted 
design analyses (e.g., thermal, optical, etc.); 2) Eliminate the filter set at temperature dimensional measurement 
requirement waived previously due to the inability to make the measurement at temperature;3) Sequester in-hand and un-
mounted filter sticks for non-flight use only until such time as re-acceptance testing can be completed; 4) Conduct Optical 
Inspections on mirrors prior to any re-work as noted above, especially SN 001, and select best candidates for flight.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Qualification – BTP and on-hand Inherited items are all already 
qualified; Compliance with qualification requirements can be established using this inheritance review. However, modified 
items (Scene Select Mirrors) should be re-qualified; 2) Materials - Previous approvals and testing on Previous Mission are 
applicable to products on hand and that are Build-to-Print and/or modified items. However, modified items need material 
certification to ensure compliance and identification/approval of any new material not used on Previous Mission.
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Typical Results to Date
Instrument 
Diode Board  
Flight spares
Recommended: Complete full testing plan used on Previous Mission for these boards.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Integrated Independent Review Requirements- N/A at the 
board level (inherited or BTP) since board designs have been previously reviewed on Previous Mission ; 2) Design 
Verification Requirements- N/A at the board level (inherited or BTP) since board designs have been previously reviewed on 
Previous Mission ; 3) Materials - Previous approvals and testing on Previous Mission are applicable to products on hand. No 
material approvals are needed for SN 003/004 unless modified; 4) EEE Parts – Previous approvals on Previous Mission  are 
applicable to products on hand. No new parts approvals are needed for SN 003/004 unless modified; 5) Parts Analysis –
Applicable to board component failures only for products on hand or BTP since all previous PCB and Material approvals on 
Previous Mission; 6) Parts Age Control – Satisfied since these Diode Boards were properly stored, there is no need for 
rescreening thus the SN 003/004 are compliant with this and the current mission’s  parts control plan and approved 
instrument’s  PCB; 7) Derating: is satisfied with assessment based on included Reliability Engineering assessment; 8) 
Prohibited Metals – Satisfied by previous PCB and Material approvals on Previous Mission; 9) Parts List - No submittal 
required from vendor. Previous Mission List, referenced above, are acceptable for the current mission. However, the vendor 
shall maintain knowledge of parts used in the current mission’s build so GIDEP/alert responses can be kept up-to-date.; 10) 
Data Requirements - Satisfied by previous PCB and Supply Chain Management audits of the vendor; 11) ESD–The developer 
shall prepare and implement an ESD control program that conforms to the requirements of ANSI/ESD S20.20 for storing and 
handling these previously developed parts and for any required re-work; 12) GIDEP Alerts and Problem Advisories - No 
Change: vendor shall participate in GIDEP in regard to inherited as well as BTP Diode boards; 13) End Item Data Package 
(EIDP) – Board level details for on-hand and BTP boards is still required in the current mission’s EIDP.
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COTS Reaction 
Wheel 
Assembly
Recommended: 1) Confirm if the same lot/date code of 5962-9800101KEC and JANSF2N7268 parts experiencing non-
conformances on the current mission have also been have been used in the Previous Mission’s RWAs. If so the project should 
develop a corrective action plan with Prime, Supplier, GSFC SC-CRAE/PRAE, and Current Mission's Parts Engineer; 2) Accept 
the RWAs as a black-box COTS items with full functional verification for acceptance and contractual return/replacement for 
non-functional units. This implies the acceptance Vendor processes, parts, materials, and the expectation of advertised 
performance (See specification in backup data). 
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Surveillance – Prime contractor surveillance is sufficient based on 
proven flight performance and GMIPs as called out in the Current Mission’s Spacecraft & Observatory Surveillance Plan can be 
eliminated or curtailed to: pre-closure inspection of flight components; 2) Quality Management System - Applicable in-project 
at GSFC; Satisfied for out-of-house RWA proven vendor processes based on item’s demonstrated COTS performance, 
therefore standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable. No process verification is required. 3) Reporting of Material 
Review Board (MRB) Actions, is still required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor MRB process; 
4) Reporting of Anomalies, is still required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor Anomaly 
process; 5) Parts – Satisfied, based on RWA being flight proven COTS assembly from a vendor with proven processes Any 
failures/issues/ alerts that Vendor becomes aware of with their COTS hardware shall require the vendor to recall/repair/ 
adjudicate the impacted assemblies; 6) Workmanship – Satisfied, since item is flight proven COTS routinely produced with 
well-established and proven vendor practices; 7) Qualification – Satisfied, since COTS item has been previously proven on the 
Previous Mission; 8) Board/Connection Building – This is a COTS item with high heritage with well-established vendor printed 
wiring board assurance testing therefore coupons are not required to be sent to GSFC; Jumpers/White wires and splices 
inherent in this RWA design as of this assessment are accepted as part of the proven design per this assessment and don’t 
require any additional waiver or MRB; 10) EEE Parts - Parts approved based on this inheritance review. No new ABPLs need to 
be supplied, parts list on file with GSFC is sufficient, unless changes are made; 11) Materials – All materials are approved via 
this inheritance review including epoxy and marking ink based on Previous Mission waivers; 12) Contamination – Satisfied, 
since item is flight proven COTS manufactured using well-established and proven vendor contamination control 
manufacturing practices. Standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required.
Typical Results to Date
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Instrument 
Scene Select 
Mechanism 
(SSM) 
assemblies 
flight spares
Recommended: 1) Consider the motor stator silver plated copper wire as a limited life item and ensure that it is never 
exposed to more than 70% RH. Reference the JSC 64647 Red Plague Control Plan for handling and storage instructions to 
properly mitigate the risk associated with this failure mechanism; 2) For added confidence that red plague is not a high risk, 
it is recommended that two samples of wire from the spare stator assembly not being used in the Instrument’s  SSM, be cut 
and evaluated; 3) Ensure that all motor assemblies are cleaned prior to next level of assembly and that any particles 
magnetically bound to the magnetic rotors are removed; 4) Re-work any magnets with exposed magnet material to prevent 
corrosion. Verify successful coating with QA inspection; 5) Motor S/N 007: If selected for flight perform non-destructive 
inspections and analysis to confirm the magnet on the stator does not have a crack. 
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Qualification – BTP and on-hand Inherited items are all already 
qualified; Compliance with qualification requirements can be established using this inheritance review; 2) EEE Parts – Should 
be considered approved under this assessment; 3) Materials - Previous approvals and testing on the Previous Mission are 
applicable to products on hand;
Typical Results to Date
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COTS & Spare 
Pressure 
Transducer 
Recommended: 1) Accept the spare Previous Mission pressure transducers S/N 36697 and S/N 36699)as is for flight spare 
purposes; 2) Include a requirement in the 30005 purchase order that JANS2N2222A transistors from lot date code 1011 are 
prohibited from use in the flight product; 3) Accept the Vendor pressure transducers as a black-box COTS item with full 
functional verification for acceptance and contractual return/replacement for non-functional units. This implies the 
acceptance of Vendor processes, parts, materials, and the expectation of advertised performance; 4) Use Risk Assessment as 
a replacement for any waivers/deviation on pressure transducer; 
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Quality Management System - Satisfied for out-of-house 
pressure transducer trusted vendor based on item being proven COTS; therefore, standard vendor processes and controls 
are acceptable; no process verification is required; 2) Reporting of Material Review Board (MRB) Actions, is still required; 
Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor MRB process; 3) Reporting of Anomalies, is still required; 
Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor Anomaly process; 4) Workmanship – Satisfied, since item 
is proven COTS from trusted vendor. Standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required; 5) 
ESD – Satisfied, since item is proven COTS from a trusted vendor. Standard vendor processes  and controls are acceptable, 
no verification is required; 6)  Board/Connection Building – COTS item with high heritage from a trusted vendor, thus 
printed wiring board coupons are not required; Jumpers/White wires and splices inherent in this pressure transducer design 
as of this assessment are accepted as part of the proven design per this assessment and don’t require any additional waiver 
or MRB; 7) Board/Connection Building – COTS item with high heritage from a trusted vendor printed wiring board coupons 
are not required; Jumpers/White wires and splices inherent in this pressure transducer design as of this assessment are 
accepted as part of the proven design per this assessment and don’t require any additional waiver or MRB; 8) EEE Parts -
Parts approved based on this inheritance review. Submittal of ABPLs is recommended for record keeping. Vendor responses 
to GIDEPs shall be pursued and kept up-to-date; 9) Materials – All materials are approved via this inheritance review; 9) 
Contamination – Satisfied, since item is COTS from a trusted vendor. Standard vendor processes and controls are 
acceptable; no verification is required.
Typical Results to Date
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COTS Solar Array 
Drive
Recommended: 1) Have Vendor update the Current Mission’s FMEA to include slip ring short consequences to properly 
reflect worst case sub-system and system effects in case of signal and power shorting; 2) That slip ring material samples 
of E.S. 193, E.S. 222, E.S. 307, E.S. 308, & E.S. 436 be provided by vendor for outgassing testing; 3) Accept the Vendor 
SADA as a black-box Commercial Item with full functional verification for acceptance and contractual return/replacement 
for non-functional units. This implies the acceptance of Vendor processes, parts, materials, and the expectation of 
advertised performance; 4) Use this Risk Assessment as a replacement for any waivers/deviation on Vendor SADA; 
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Surveillance –GMIPs as called out in the the current mission’s 
Spacecraft & Observatory Surveillance Plan can be eliminated or curtailed to pre-closure inspection of flight components, 
except for pre-closure inspection of slip rings. Pre-closure inspection of slip rings including photographic documentation 
is highly recommended; 2) Quality Management System - Applicable in-project at GSFC; Satisfied for out-of-house SADA 
proven vendor processes based on item’s demonstrated COTS performance, therefore standard vendor processes and 
controls are acceptable. No process verification is required. 3) Reporting of Material Review Board (MRB) Actions, is still 
required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor MRB process; 4) Reporting of Anomalies, is 
still required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor Anomaly process; 5) Workmanship –
Satisfied, since item is flight proven Commercial Item routinely produced with well-established and proven vendor 
practices. Standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification via audit or GMIP is required; 6) 
Qualification – Satisfied, since Commercial Item has been previously proven on the Previous Mission and other missions;
7) ESD – Satisfied, since item is a flight proven Commercial Item using well-established and proven vendor ESD 
manufacturing practices. Standard vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required; 8) EEE Parts 
- Parts approved based on this inheritance review. No new ABPLs need to be supplied, parts list on file with GSFC is 
sufficient, unless changes are made. Vendor responses to GIDEPs shall be pursued and kept up-to-date with vendor as 
built data; 9) Materials – All materials are approved via this inheritance review; 10) Contamination – Satisfied, since item 
is flight proven Commercial Item manufactured using well-established and proven vendor contamination control 
manufacturing practices. 
Typical Results to Date
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COTS SADE
Electronic 
Control Unit 
(ECU) 
Recommended: 1) Ensure that the ferrite beads are from the same lot/date code (LDC) as other mission builds; 2) Ensure 
that EEE parts used in the current mission’s build are from the same LDC as other mission parts; 3) Confirm, if CB18766-
001 hybrid is from the same LDC another mission. If not, it shall be submitted to the PCB for radiation approval; 4) 
Positronic connectors are impacted by CHM-P-16-01A GIDEP. This GIDEP details an issue where contacts may have missing 
spring clips. If assembly is not yet completed all contacts shall be 100% visually inspected or force tested to confirm 
presence of spring clip; 5) Accept the Vendor SADE/ECU as a black-box Commercial Item with full functional verification for 
acceptance and contractual return/replacement for non-functional units. This implies the acceptance of Vendor processes, 
parts (see exceptions above), materials, and the expectation of advertised performance; 6) Use Risk Assessment as a 
replacement for any waivers/deviation on Vendor ECU/SADE.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Surveillance –GMIPs as called out in the current mission’s 
Spacecraft & Observatory Surveillance Plan can be eliminated or curtailed to pre-closure inspection of flight components;
2) Quality Management System - Applicable in-project at GSFC; Satisfied for out-of-house SADE/ECU proven vendor 
processes based on item’s demonstrated Commercial Item performance, therefore standard vendor processes and 
controls are acceptable. No process verification is required; 3) Reporting of Material Review Board (MRB) Actions, is still 
required; Government is not required to participate in or verify the Vendor MRB process.  MRB reports are requested for 
information; 4) Reporting of Anomalies, is still required; Government is not required to participate in or verify the Vendor 
Anomaly process. Anomaly Review Board reports are requested for information; 5) Workmanship – Satisfied, since item is 
flight proven Commercial Item routinely produced with well-established and proven vendor practices. Standard vendor 
processes and controls are acceptable; no verification via audit or GMIP is required; 6) Qualification – Satisfied, since 
Commercial Item has been previously proven on Previous Mission and other missions;7) ESD – Satisfied, since item is a 
flight proven Commercial Item using well-established and proven vendor ESD manufacturing practices. Standard vendor 
processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required; 8) Board/Connection Building – This is a Commercial 
Item with high heritage therefore PCB coupons are not required to be sent to GSFC, in lieu of review of PCB 
manufacturer’s and developer’s PCB coupon testing results, or if PCB from same Lot/Date Code as for a Previous Mission 
are used; 9) EEE Parts - Parts approved based on this inheritance review. No new ABPLs need to be supplied, parts list on 
file with GSFC is sufficient, unless changes are made; 10) Materials – All materials are approved via this inheritance review; 
11) Contamination – Satisfied, since item is flight proven Commercial Item manufactured using well-established and 
proven vendor contamination control manufacturing practices.  
Typical Results to Date
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COTS Inertial 
Reference Unit (COTS-
IRU)
Recommended: 1) Confirm if there are any EEE parts differences between the Previous Mission COTS-IRU when 
compared to the current mission COTS-IRU; 2) Confirm if there are any software changes between Previous Mission  
COTS-IRU when compared to the current mission COTS-IRU; 3) Avoid Ferrite Beads manufactured in China, unless DPA is 
performed to rule out cracking and chipping; 4) Confirm  if start up time is met with starting three or four gyros. If four 
gyros need to be started, adjust the procedures for the use of the COTS-IRU, e.g. start all four gyros and then shut one 
off; 5) Accept the Vendor COTS-IRU as a black-box COTS items with full functional verification for acceptance and 
contractual return/replacement for non-functional units. This implies the acceptance Vendor processes, parts, 
materials, and the expectation of advertised performance; 6) Use Risk Assessment as a replacement for any 
waivers/deviation on COTS-IRU.
MAR requirement verifications/changes recommended: 1) Surveillance –GMIPs as called out in the current mission’s 
Spacecraft & Observatory Surveillance Plan can be eliminated or curtailed to pre-closure inspection of flight 
components; 2) Quality Management System - Applicable in-project at GSFC; Satisfied for out-of-house COTS-IRU 
proven vendor processes based on item’s demonstrated COTS performance, therefore standard vendor processes and 
controls are acceptable. No process verification is required. 3) Reporting of Material Review Board (MRB) Actions is still 
required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor MRB process; 4) Reporting of Anomalies is 
still required; Government is not required to verify or participate in the Vendor Anomaly process; 5) Parts – Satisfied, 
based on COTS-IRU being flight proven COTS assembly from a vendor with proven processes Any failures/issues/ alerts 
that Vendor becomes aware of with their COTS hardware shall require the vendor to recall/repair/adjudicate the 
impacted assemblies; 6) Workmanship – Satisfied, since item is flight proven COTS routinely produced with well-
established and proven vendor practices; 7) Qualification – Satisfied, since COTS item has been previously proven on the 
Previous Mission; 8) Board/Connection Building – This is a COTS item with high heritage with well-established vendor 
printed wiring board assurance testing therefore coupons are not required to be sent to GSFC; Jumpers/White wires 
and splices inherent in this design as of this assessment are accepted as part of the proven design per this assessment 
and don’t require any additional waiver or MRB; 10) EEE Parts - Parts approved based on this inheritance review. No 
new ABPLs need to be supplied, parts list on file with GSFC is sufficient, unless changes are made; 11) Materials – All 
materials are approved via this inheritance review; 12) Contamination – Satisfied, since item is flight proven COTS 
manufactured using well-established and proven vendor contamination control manufacturing practices. Standard 
vendor processes and controls are acceptable; no verification is required.
Typical Results to Date
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 Process is viewed as value-added and 
requests are overwhelming current staff.
 Consistency between Risk Assessments, 
Recommendations, and SMA 
Requirement Tailoring needs to be 
maintained
 Some recommendations are not always 
fully implemented by projects while 
others are.
 Heritage is not a guarantee of no risk.
 Data gathering and processing time are 
significantly reduced on recurring 
submittals
 Continual education and expectation 
leveling is needed to institutionalize the 
process and its outcomes
Lessons Learned
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 Improved risk reduction 
 Focus project resources on higher risk items, e.g. new developments
 Knowledge sharing from previous missions across GSFC
More consistent non-conformance acceptance approach across 
projects / missions commensurate with payload risk classification
 Acceptance of SMA non-conformances and nonstandard practices 
that pose little or no increased risk to the mission
 Reducing the introduction of risk by having the manufacturer change 
the manufacturing process and/or introduce new materials
 Less SMA waiver processing
 Cost and schedule savings
More time available for critical system-level testing
Benefits
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Summary
19
• GSFC has established an alternate path to accept and use 
heritage and spare products that were built using well-
established successful processes and requirements for systems 
developed under a comparable risk posture. 
• This process gives projects and vendors the ability to take credit 
for Inherited or Build-to-Print Items having successful histories.
• Projects are able to focus on technical risks versus process 
compliance risks by the use of this process.
• This process gives Projects recommendations and pre-
verifications of SMA/MAR requirements that they can choose to 
implement in their Risk-Based SMA Implementation.
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